Whenever the phrase "singles tax" stirs up controversy in Japan, one country is always brought up: Germany. Germany's long-term care insurance really does have a "childless surcharge" that adds to the contribution rate of people aged 23 or older who have no children. From 2025, the childless pay 4.2% of wages, while those with five or more children pay 2.6% — the contribution rate varies by as much as 1.6 percentage points depending on family composition. Why was such a system created, and what has become of it in the 20 years since its introduction? And how does it differ from Japan's child and childcare support contribution, which is collected from everyone? Based on primary sources (Germany's Federal Ministry of Health), here are the facts.
How it works: the contribution rate depends on family composition
Germany's public long-term care insurance (created in 1995, and one of the models for Japan's long-term care insurance) sets its contribution rates on wages as follows (from January 2025).
| Family composition | Contribution rate (share of wages) |
|---|---|
| No children (aged 23 or older) | 4.2% (base 3.6% + childless surcharge 0.6%) |
| One child | 3.6% (base only) |
| Two children | 3.35% |
| Three children | 3.10% |
| Five or more children | 2.60% (the discount is capped at 1.0 percentage point) |
- The base 3.6% is split evenly between employee and employer (1.8% each; only in Saxony, employee 2.3% and employer 1.3%)
- The 0.6% childless surcharge is borne entirely by the employee. A childless employee's own share therefore comes to 2.4% of wages
- A 0.25-point discount applies for each child from the second through the fifth (while the child is under 25). People born before 1940, those under 23, and recipients of unemployment benefits, among others, are exempt from the surcharge
Comparison at a monthly salary equivalent to 500,000 yen (employee share, approximate)
- No children: about 12,000 yen per month (2.4%)
- Two children: about 7,750 yen per month (the employee's 1.8% base share less 0.25 points × 2 = 1.55%)
- The difference is a few thousand yen a month — tens of thousands of yen a year. A level that is "not small enough to go unnoticed, but not large enough to change your life plans"
Why it exists: the Constitutional Court recognized raising children as a contribution to the insurance system
This system was not a politician's bright idea — it was born from a court order.
- 2001: Germany's Federal Constitutional Court ruled that in a pay-as-you-go long-term care insurance system, raising children — the future supporters of the system — is itself a contribution to the system on a par with money, and that charging the same contribution rate to those who raise children and those who do not is unequal. It ordered lawmakers to remedy this
- 2005: In response to the ruling, the "childless surcharge" was introduced (initially 0.25 points)
- 2022: The Constitutional Court ruled again that the number of children must also be taken into account
- July 2023: The surcharge was raised to 0.6 points, and at the same time discounts based on the number of children from the second child onward were introduced — the system's current form
In other words, Germany's rationale is not "a punishment for the childless" but "lower contributions for those who raised the next generation that sustains the pay-as-you-go system". It is a good example of how the very same system leaves a completely different impression depending on which side you tell it from.
What happened: finances did not get easier, and the controversy has not ended
- No proven effect as a measure against the declining birthrate: There is no clear evidence that Germany's birthrate turned upward after the surcharge was introduced (2005). The system was designed in the first place for "fairness of burden," not to raise the birthrate
- Long-term care finances remain tight: With an aging population, benefits keep growing, and the base rate has kept rising — 3.05% in 2019, 3.4% in 2023, and 3.6% in 2025. Even with the surcharge, the funding problem is not solved
- The side effect of "administrative costs": Applying the discounts requires proof of the number and ages of children, and there is practical criticism that the administrative burden on employers and insurers has increased
- Both those who see it as "achieving fairness" and those who criticize it as "a charge on lifestyle" still exist today — the controversy has not ended even 20 years after introduction
Comparison with Japan: "surcharge on the childless only" versus "collect from everyone"
What was labeled a "singles tax" and sparked controversy in Japan is the child and childcare support contribution (an add-on to medical insurance premiums) that started in April 2026. The two look similar, but their structures differ.
| Germany: childless surcharge | Japan: child and childcare support contribution | |
|---|---|---|
| Who pays | Only those without children bear the surcharge (with discounts by number of children) | Everyone pays, with or without children |
| What the money funds | Long-term care insurance benefits (care for the elderly) | Childcare support such as expanded child allowances |
| Rationale | Reflecting differences in "generational contribution" to a pay-as-you-go system in the rates (by order of the Constitutional Court) | Everyone contributes because "measures against the declining birthrate benefit society as a whole" |
| How it is criticized | "A fine on the childless" | "A de facto singles tax," "a de facto tax increase" |
What is interesting is that Japan's contribution is criticized because child-raising households also pay, while Germany's surcharge is criticized because only the childless pay. Each design draws its own backlash, and there is still no universal answer to "who should bear how much of the cost of the next generation." The amounts and mechanics of Japan's contribution are explained in our guide to the child and childcare support contribution, and each party's position on abolishing or keeping it is laid out in our comparison of political parties' tax stances.
When it affects Japanese people: expatriates in Germany actually pay it
- Japanese nationals working in Germany are, in principle, enrolled in this system. If you are 23 or older and have no children, 2.4% of your wages (the employee share) is withheld every month. On a monthly salary equivalent to 500,000 yen, that is about 12,000 yen a month
- What the Japan–Germany social security agreement coordinates against dual enrollment is mainly pensions; for long-term care insurance, the basic rule is that Germany's system applies (treatment varies with the length of the posting and other factors, so check with your company or a licensed social insurance consultant before your assignment)
- Expatriates with children receive the discount once they submit documents proving the number of children to their employer. If you fail to submit them, you keep being charged with the surcharge, so put this on your pre-assignment checklist
FAQ
Q. Does Germany's "childless surcharge" apply only to single people?
A. No. The criterion is not marital status but whether you have children. Married people without children are subject to the surcharge, and single people with children pay the base rate. The Japanese nickname "singles tax" is not accurate.
Summary
- Germany's long-term care insurance adds a 0.6% surcharge for childless people aged 23 and over; from 2025 the childless pay 4.2% of salary.
- Each child from the 2nd to the 5th brings a 0.25-point discount, so with 5 or more children the rate is 2.60%.
- The 0.6% surcharge is borne entirely by the employee, so a childless person's own share is 2.4% of salary.
- It was introduced in 2005 following a 2001 ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, and its effect as a birth-rate measure has not been demonstrated.
- Japan's child and child-rearing support levy is structured differently: everyone pays, regardless of whether they have children.
Reference links (sources)
Note: The German rates are based on information published by the Federal Ministry of Health (applicable from January 2025; page as updated in March 2026). The rules may be amended. This article provides information for comparing systems and does not argue for or against any particular policy.













